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BOOK REVIEW
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POROUS BOUNDARY
BETWEEN ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY
CORPORATE FRAUD
ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT,
BY TOM BAKER AND SEAN J. GRIFFITH, 2010

Miriam H. Baer*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of a massive financial meltdown that has triggered a
protracted crisis and recession, one might argue that the time has come for
commentators to reduce their emphasis on intentional wrongdoing within
corporations, insofar as this last go-around of failures seemed to be caused
by factors beyond simple, intentional fraud.1 Nevertheless, our appetite for
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. This book review stems from comments that
were delivered at an Author Meets Reader panel at the Law and Society Association’s
Annual Meeting in San Francisco, 2011, which was organized by Tanina Rostain. The
author thanks Tom Baker and Sean Griffith for encouraging the writing of this review and
their generous feedback in response to an earlier draft. The author also gratefully thanks
Professor Rostain for her invitation to sit on the Law and Society panel, as well as Dana
Brakman-Reiser, James Fanto, Roberta Karmel, and James Park for comments on earlier
drafts, and Dean Michael Gerber and President Joan Wexler of Brooklyn Law School,
whose summer research stipend supported the writing of this Review.
1. Commentators have attributed the meltdown to numerous factors, although there
appears to be a consensus that “excessive risk-taking by major financial institutions was an
important cause [of the crisis] . . . and consequently, that there were significant failures of
risk management systems at such firms.” Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for RiskManagement Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010); RICHARD
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (2009) (blaming the financial crisis on poor regulatory
response to risk-taking); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time
of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011) (identifying moral hazard and excessive risk-taking
within financial firms as cause of crisis); see also Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate
Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65
BUS. LAW. 1, 3–4 (2009) (concluding from an empirical study that corporate governance
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the subject—and the various mechanisms that seem best poised to fight
it—remains as strong as ever. Perhaps this is because economic crises—
intentional or otherwise—deftly highlight the extent to which corporate
chieftains exercise a vast amount of power and influence over our economy
and political system.2 It is hardly surprising, then, that commentators
worry both about the ways in which corporate chieftains abuse the
shareholding public’s trust, and whether existing legal tools are best
designed to deter such abuses.
Professors Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have enhanced this highly
charged debate with their nuanced and fine-grained account of how
corporations procure insurance for their directors and officers (so-called
“D&O insurance”).3 Baker and Griffith skillfully educate their audience on
what this type of insurance is, how it is sold and marketed, and how it
affects corporate officers and directors and the possibility of misconduct
within corporate firms. Although the discussion is balanced and thorough,
the title itself will lead most readers to conclude the worst, which is that
D&O insurance “ensures” the continued existence of corporate misconduct
by shielding directors and officers from personal monetary liability and
legal accountability.4 Although the authors do not contend that D&O

functioned fairly well outside of the financial sector).
2. “Corporations dominate the business world, accounting for an overwhelming
majority of commercial revenues and serving as the nearly exclusive organizational form for
large-scale enterprise.” Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1507 (2009).
3. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). Earlier discussions
of these issues appeared in other works by Baker and Griffith. See Tom Baker & Sean J.
Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’
Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance
Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits
Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
755 (2009).
4. The concern that directors and officers have escaped the consequences of their own
malfeasance has been well explored in both the business press and academic literature. See,
e.g., Steven Davidoff, Ex-Directors of Failed Firms Have Little to Fear, DealBook (Aug. 2,
2011, 8:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/ex-directors-of-failed-firms-havelittle-to-fear/; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay
on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006); Renee M.
Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in
Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving
Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud,
Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007) [hereinafter Wheels]; see also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins &
Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (finding close
to no risk for outside directors for inattentiveness or insufficient oversight).
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insurance causes fraud, they nevertheless argue that its presence vastly
undermines the private litigation system erected to deter fraud.
Accordingly, Baker and Griffith focus private litigation’s critics on a new
target, the D&O insurance product that so well serves corporate directors
and officers.
Through excerpts of multiple conversations with key players in the
insurance world,5 Baker and Griffith paint a picture that is not particularly
pretty: insurance prevents managers from paying for the costs of securities
litigation stemming from corporate misconduct, but the insurance
insufficiently reflects the corporation’s individual governance risks.6
During the life of the insurance policy, insurance carriers fail to monitor the
insureds adequately (if at all).7 Finally, when litigation arises, D&O
insurers (unlike other types of carriers) allow corporate managers
substantial latitude to negotiate settlements with insurers’ money.8 In sum,
insurance carriers fail to monitor corporate managers robustly before,
during, and after an incident of corporate misconduct surfaces.
One might reply that, whatever its drawbacks, D&O insurance at least
spreads a single corporation’s litigation risk to a broader pool, which in
turn indirectly benefits shareholders. But even here, Baker and Griffith see
little value. Insurance carriers charge fees in exchange for performing their
risk-spreading function; corporations, and effectively their shareholders,
pay these fees. Shareholders, however, could just as easily avoid the fees
by skipping the insurance and diversifying their stock portfolios.9
Nor do Baker and Griffith find much of an information-pooling
benefit from D&O insurance, through which firms might discover the
techniques or structures that result in less serious or frequent wrongdoing.10
Unlike other types of insurance (casualty insurance, for example), D&O

5. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 13–17 (describing research methodology and
listing categories of interview subjects).
6. Id. at 103–04 (concluding that although carriers “attempt to price corporate
governance risk” their efforts may be compromised by market forces and “defects of either
the underwriting system or the liability system”).
7. Id. at 109 (“D&O insurers do almost nothing to monitor the public corporations
they insure.”).
8. “D&O insurance policies provide the insurance company with the right to
‘associate’ in the defense of the claim, meaning that the insurer is entitled to receive
information about the defense of the claim and to provide input to the defense lawyers, but
the clear understanding and practice are that the policy holder, not the insurance company,
controls the defense of the claim.” Id. at 130 (identifying key differences between D&O
insurance defense and other forms of liability insurance).
9. Id. at 57–58.
10. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
593, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038105 (discussing insurance pooling).
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insurance does not produce industry-wide data leading to better compliance
outcomes.11 Since D&O insurance does not produce better outcomes, it
simply protects managers from payouts and introduces moral hazard.12
Corporate officers become less, not more, accountable for corporate
wrongdoing, and shareholders foot the bill.13
This is a deeply troubling critique, likely to invoke concern and
discomfort among jurists, policymakers and academics. Some may
conclude from Baker and Griffith’s findings that we should discontinue or
radically curtail the availability of D&O insurance, even though the authors
themselves avoid embracing such a drastic response. Others may see
Baker and Griffith’s account as additional support for the view that public
enforcement by the SEC, as opposed to private enforcement via
shareholder litigation, is the optimal vehicle for restraining corporate
misconduct.14
Like Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, this Book Review also adopts a
pragmatic approach, albeit one that is more skeptical of the notion that
corporate managers can commit fraud without worry. As I argue below,
the state of the world becomes a bit murkier when one reflects upon the
porous boundary between ordinary and extraordinary corporate
misconduct. It is along this boundary that the limited, spontaneous
embezzlement scheme imperceptibly bleeds into a multi-year, multidivision Ponzi scheme. Whereas the former may be solely the focus of
private litigation, the latter is very much the focus of public enforcement
and sanctions.
Although the authors acknowledge that corporate
misconduct can support “a multiplicity of state and federal causes of
action,”15 their critique downplays the effect of public enforcement
11. Instead, D&O insurance “mutes the deterrence effect of shareholder litigation.”
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 201.
12. “As it is currently structured, D&O insurance significantly erodes the deterrent
effect of shareholder litigation, thereby undermining its effectiveness as a form of
regulation.” Id. at 3. For a useful recent discussion of moral hazard and insurance, see
Dustin E. Buehler & Steve P. Calandrillo, Baseball’s Moral Hazard: Law, Economics, and
the Designated Hitter Rule, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2097–99 (2010).
13. “[V]irtually all U.S. public corporations purchase D&O insurance, and shareholder
litigation is largely funded by insurance proceeds. What this ultimately means, to both
plaintiffs and corporate defendants alike, is that their settlements are funded by other
people’s money.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 202.
14. For examples of recent calls for a reduced emphasis on or narrowing of private
shareholder litigation for securities fraud, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011) (arguing for
substantial narrowing of private fraud-on-the-market claims); and Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (suggesting
prescreening role for SEC).
15. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 40.
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responses on corporate managers, in part because they appear to believe
that much of private litigation is directed at “ordinary” fraud, and that
public enforcers reserve their limited resources for extraordinary “superfrauds.”16 If the line between ordinary and extraordinary fraud is weak,
however, then a robust public deterrence effort for the latter may make up
for a weak private deterrence system for the former. No doubt, the
permeability of this boundary does not undermine Baker and Griffith’s key
claim that shareholders have been paying for a product that produces
relatively few returns. Still, it provides important insights on the authors’
policy suggestions for improving the current state of affairs. These
proposals (for a “coinsurance” system, disclosure of insurance contracts,
and a lottery system designed to reduce settlements),17 may be less
necessary, and in some instances, redundant, when we consider the broader
enforcement landscape in which corporate managers reside.18
The remainder of this Review proceeds in three parts. First, I
summarize the authors’ analysis of the D&O insurance market and its
alleged effect on corporate management. In Part II, I analyze Baker and
Griffith’s accountability critique by exploring at length the porous
boundary between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” frauds.19 Since no level
of insurance protects corporate chieftains from the wrath of criminal
prosecutors, state attorneys general, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) Enforcement Division, D&O insurance’s potential
for causing moral hazard in private litigation therefore must be considered
alongside the deterrence effects of public enforcement.20 With this broader
16. Id. at 60–61 (suggesting that nonmonetary losses such as criminal penalties and
loss of reputation “do not follow from most acts that give rise to a D&O claim”).
17. See discussion infra pp. 124-27 (laying out proposals in greater detail).
18. This is not to deny that private and public corporate enforcement mechanisms have
collectively demonstrated serious shortcomings. See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions,
and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1297–1313 (2011)
(providing a recent overview of the literature documenting flaws in entity-liability as a
deterrent of corporate accounting fraud).
19. I focus on fraud because it is the primary target of Baker and Griffith’s critique.
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 21 (“Much of our discussion therefore focuses on
shareholder class actions under the federal securities laws, particularly 10b-5 class
actions.”).
20. Several scholars have recognized and addressed the fact that multiple private and
public enforcers address corporate wrongdoing. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall Thomas
with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53
DUKE L.J. 737, 738 (2003) (observing that “[a] public private partnership for the
enforcement of the securities laws is now entering its eighth decade”). Cf. Geraldine Szott
Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and
Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1470 (2009) (noting that “private civil
actions involving securities laws may be viewed as ‘essential supplements’ to public
enforcement or as abusive demands on law-abiding companies”).
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enforcement picture in mind, I assess in Part III several of Baker and
Griffith’s policy proposals.
I.

THE DEPRESSING STORY OF D&O LIABILITY INSURANCE

Baker and Griffith begin their analysis with a brief exploration of the
justifications for corporate shareholder litigation.21 The authors agree with
the scholarly consensus that the compensation rationale for shareholder
litigation is neither accurate nor desirable.22 Shareholders receive a mere
fraction of their losses once attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation are taken
into account.23 Moreover, it is far from clear that shareholders are entitled
to any payout, given securities litigation’s circularity.24 That is, when the
company agrees to a settlement for securities fraud (or in rare cases, pays a
post-trial judgment), its current shareholders effectively pay those
shareholders who purchased and sold securities during the fraud period for
the misconduct that was committed by directors and officers. Assuming
shareholders are diversified, they are simply paying themselves, less
transaction costs, for the very wrongs they suffered.25
With compensation out of the way, deterrence remains the only real
justification for shareholder litigation. The authors rightfully question
whether the system for procuring D&O liability protection enhances,
21. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 5–10.
22. See id. at 6 (observing that “an emerging consensus among most corporate and
securities law scholars rejects compensation as a justification for shareholder litigation”).
23. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1545–47 (striking down the compensation rationale);
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 635 & n.35 (“[Private litigation] delivers at best only five to ten
cents per dollar of alleged losses (often less), compensates far too many investors who do
not have the same claim to compensation, and comes at a very high price tag that eats up
fifteen to thirty percent of the claims in plaintiffs’ legal fees and costs plus arguably even
more in indirect costs (particularly defendants’ legal fees and costs).”).
24. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
237, 252 (2009) (contending that “the primary social benefit from a higher level of
disclosure by established issuers is not the protection of investors from unfair prices or
risk”).
25. This is the famous pocket-shifting or “circularity” argument that has long been a
source of discussion among corporate academics. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J.
Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U.
ILL. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1992) (describing how private securities litigation simultaneously
imposes costs and benefits on innocent shareholders); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1562–63
(2006) (noting that private securities litigation, victims of fraudulent behavior and
shareholders are largely the same class); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem
in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 345–47 (explaining why the
circularity problem exists only when diversified investors are assumed). But see James J.
Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 328–33 (2009)
(questioning existence of circularity problem by comparing settlement payment to the
corporate dividend).
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undermines, or has no effect on litigation’s deterrent effect. Based on their
interviews with, among others, risk managers and D&O brokers and
carriers, Baker and Griffith soberly conclude that insurance undermines the
deterrent effect of shareholder litigation.
The key to understanding this critique is Baker and Griffith’s succinct
description of the standard D&O insurance product. Each insurance policy
has three components, which are called “sides” by the industry
participants.26 Side A coverage directly covers directors and officers for
claims for which the company cannot practically or legally pay.27 The
second and third “sides” of the standard D&O policy, Sides B and C, are
the stronger targets of Baker and Griffith’s critique, as these provisions
compensate the company for the indemnification it pays directors and
officers (Side B), and for any liability the company bears separately on its
own (Side C).28 As the authors explain, Side C seems to have arisen to
keep the insurance carriers from arguing with insureds over how a
particular settlement ought to be allocated when “the company” and its
officers and directors are deemed equally responsible for a given course of
conduct.29
Although the authors are willing to accept the standard argument for
A-side protection, which is that it serves as a form of protection for
otherwise risk-averse officers and directors,30 Baker and Griffith are far
more critical of Sides B and C, which also happen to be the sources of the
“vast majority”31 of D&O insurance payments.

26. See generally BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 46–48 (discussing Sides A, B,
and C).
27. The company’s inability to indemnify the corporate manager may result from its
bankruptcy or stem from the fact that Delaware law permits corporations to insure corporate
managers for certain claims while simultaneously forbidding the same corporations from
directly indemnifying them. Id. at 64 (observing that “one of the main functions of side A
coverage is to protect the directors’ and officers’ assets in the event of bankruptcy”). So, for
example, the corporation may not indemnify managers for claims successfully pursued in
derivative litigation against the corporation’s managers, but it can purchase insurance to
cover the same managers for that contingency. Id. at 43–44.
28. Id. at 47 (“Payments under Side B coverage are thus triggered when the
corporation incurs an obligation to indemnify its officers or directors, which most policies
deem to be required in every case in which a corporation is legally permitted to do so.”).
29. Id. at 47–48.
30. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 24, at 288 (“The normal justification for having the issuer
purchase directors and officers (D&O) insurance is that it is necessary to attract qualified
people to do these other tasks. The risk of a large judgment being imposed erroneously, the
argument goes, would make such a person unwilling to serve without insurance.”). Fox
favors the dissolution of D&O liability insurance, and in its place, a cap on damages. Id.
31. Baker & Griffith, supra note 3, at 48. This analytical move poses somewhat of a
puzzle. If, as Baker and Griffith claim, private shareholders’ litigation is inadequately
deterring managerial misconduct, then why do they so easily let Side A insurance off the
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Having laid out the various components of the D&O insurance policy,
Baker and Griffith then consider whether D&O insurance maintains or
reduces shareholder litigation’s deterrent effect. An insurance policy that
completely insulates a director or officer from monetary payment,
regardless of how poorly that director or officer has behaved, is undesirable
because it creates moral hazard. Accordingly, throughout much of the
book, Baker and Griffith inquire of their research subjects whether D&O
insurance carriers adequately prevent the moral hazard problem through the
pricing of insurance policies, increased monitoring of insureds, and
adequate control of litigation defense costs and strategy.
For the most part, Baker and Griffith’s research demonstrates that
D&O insurance carriers either fail to engage in the activities necessary to
prevent moral hazard, or, at the very least, fail to do them as well as they
should. Through a collection of extensive interviews, which they excerpt
throughout the book, Baker and Griffith demonstrate that D&O policies do
not result in increased monitoring during the life of a policy;32 or a robust,
experienced-based pricing of policies;33 or in the proliferation of loss
prevention services.34 Nor do they result in sufficient monitoring once a
lawsuit is actually brought.35 To the contrary, insurers allow corporate
defendants to shape the litigation strategy and settlement terms, and place
far less oversight over corporate defense counsel than the purveyors of
other types of insurance.36
Even worse, the insurance appears to forge an unholy alliance between
defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Because the insurance policies include
explicit coverage exclusions for fraud and intentional misconduct,37
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who obtain the policies through discovery and are
keenly aware of their limits and exceptions, intentionally alter their
pleadings and negotiation stances in order to access the amounts set forth in
hook? More importantly, why are they so dismissive of Side B insurance, assuming
managers might feel more comfortable signing a contract with a company that had bonded
itself for insurance with a third party?
32. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 109.
33. Baker and Griffith worry that although carriers attempt to price “governance risk”
into the insured’s D&O policy, they do so ineffectively: “[T]he actuaries we interviewed
doubted that underwriters have a consistent system of evaluation that applies the same
factors in the same way over time.” Id. at 98.
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 130.
36. On claims management, see id. at 134 (concluding that “D&O insurers have
relatively little control over who conducts the defense” and “over how the defense is
conducted”).
37. Id. at 48–51. “[O]nce a claim is moving toward settlement at or near the limits of
the D&O policy, the plaintiffs and the defense have common adversaries—namely, the
D&O insurers.” Id. at 143.
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the D&O policies.38 Accordingly, D&O insurance not only increases moral
hazard within corporate firms, but it also reduces transparency generally,
since neither shareholders nor the public learn what has transpired.
Baker and Griffith go into much further detail than is possible to
convey in this Review, including an overview of the D&O market, excerpts
of conversations with multiple players who describe everything from the
pricing of insurance to the factors that drive settlements, and an analysis
(and rejection) of the various reasons, other than agency costs, that might
explain the purchase of D&O liability insurance.39 For the purpose of this
discussion, it is sufficient to summarize their conclusions as follows:
entity-side insurance plays the important role of capping liability
artificially, reducing truth in claims, and creating moral hazard. Directors
and officers who are covered by state-of-the art D&O insurance policies
can rest easy in the knowledge that they likely will never pay out a dime on
a shareholder suit, and their company will pay little more than the amount
previously negotiated by the company’s designated risk manager.40
Shareholders, meanwhile, fail to enjoy the deterrent effect of shareholder
litigation. The game is rigged, the amount is capped, and shareholders
lose. Were one to stop here, one rightfully would be quite concerned.
II.

INTRODUCING THE POROUS BOUNDARY BETWEEN ORDINARY AND
EXTRAORDINARY FRAUD

Although Baker and Griffith mount a powerful critique of D&O
insurance, there are, fortunately, some good reasons to doubt that D&O
insurance “ensures” corporate misconduct. Because it is beyond the scope
of their project, the authors do not consider at length how managers may be
affected by the broader enforcement landscape, which includes public
regulators, state attorneys general, and criminal prosecutors. If public
enforcement is strong, then D&O insurance’s effect on managerial
behavior may be of less consequence than Baker and Griffith suspect.41
38. Id. at 49, 147, 187 (reporting evidence that plaintiffs’ and defense counsel
explicitly collude to convince D&O carriers to settle). Baker and Griffith further observe
that plaintiffs’ lawyers “plead strategically in order to avoid handing the insurer a valid
coverage defense.” Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 51–56, 57–76.
40. In some cases, the company itself may be forced to contribute to the settlement, but
that contribution will be relatively small compared to its insurance coverage. Id. at 10
(reporting, from review of Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse website, that “the amount
of the corporation’s contribution was substantially less than the amount paid by the
corporation’s D&O insurers, and in some cases, the payment may have been part of
satisfying an insurance deductible”).
41. I do not mean to suggest here that public enforcement in fact operates at optimal
levels.
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Moreover, even if public enforcement is weak or uneven, there may be a
good argument for fine-tuning or strengthening it rather than directing
attention toward private litigation.42 Private litigation-as-enforcement, after
all, includes a number of agency costs. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, insurance
carriers, and even defense attorneys all have their own interests, which may
or may not align with those of shareholders. Public enforcement, at least in
theory, can avoid some of these problems.43
More importantly, the authors seem to assume that much of private
litigation involves “ordinary fraud” that is beyond the pale of most public
enforcement efforts.44 It is this assumption that this Review challenges.
Consider the following: let us assume that all shareholder losses stem from
one of three causes. The first is incompetence and bad decision-making.
Officers and directors make numerous mistakes, some of which are masked
by luck and some of which cause companies to lose money and fail. The
second source of loss is a type of misconduct that I will refer to for now as
“ordinary fraud.” Some commentators may refer to it as “garden variety”
fraud. Ordinary fraud results from agency costs that often reduce the value
of the company. Although vexatious, it is neither so harmful nor so
complicated as to draw the ire of public enforcement authorities. Finally,
the third category is what I refer to as
“extraordinary” fraud.
Extraordinary frauds involve more severe losses, threaten many more
victims, and therefore trigger criminal and civil investigations by public
authorities.
I fully admit that for purposes of this analysis, the difference between
ordinary and extraordinary fraud is purely result-driven: a fraud becomes
extraordinary when public authorities decide to treat it as such. I do not
attempt to distinguish these categories by what corporate managers actually
do because the law itself does not draw such a bright line.45 One of the
great problems—and opportunities—for social planners is that putative
defendants often do not know in advance whether an ordinary fraud is
42. Indeed, several scholars have recently argued for increasing public securities
enforcement with an eye toward reducing or eliminating certain types of private securities
litigation. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14 (arguing for substantial narrowing of
private fraud-on-market claims); Rose, supra note 14, at 1306 (proposing a public oversight
approach whereby the SEC would prescreen private 10b-5 lawsuits).
43. Rose, supra note 14, at 1305.
44. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 61.
45. For example, the ordinary frauds that lay at the heart of the corporate accounting
scandals in the early 2000’s morphed into super frauds simply because of their size. See
Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 36 n.179
(2005) (explaining that, “the fraud in WorldCom—the recharacterization of ordinary
business expenses as capitalized items—might easily be described as a ‘garden variety’
fraud, but its magnitude—eleven billion dollars—puts it into an entirely different
category”).
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likely to turn into a super fraud.46 Once upon a time, perhaps twenty years
ago, Bernard Madoff’s investment sleight of hand may have seemed like an
ordinary fraud. By the time he turned himself in to the authorities in
December 2009, however, his scam had grown into one of the largest Ponzi
schemes of all time.47
With this taxonomy of corporate loss in mind, we can better assess
Baker and Griffith’s critique by asking the question: how does D&O
liability insurance affect the three types of shareholder loss described
above?
a.

Losses from bad decision-making and bad luck:

Return, for a moment, to the first category of losses, which are caused
by incompetence and bad decision-making. It is impossible to denigrate
D&O liability insurance for either causing or exacerbating these losses
because shareholder litigation is not intended to deter or compensate these
ills. To the contrary, state and federal legislators and jurists have largely
decided that incompetence and bad decision-making ought not to be the
subject of shareholder litigation, much less class actions brought under
Rule 10b-5.48 Markets and shareholder democracy take care of these
problems, along with social norms and signaling.49 Accordingly, the proper
46. More importantly, managers themselves may be unable to predict those instances
in which ordinary fraud will morph into extraordinary fraud. See Michael Guttentag,
Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 74 (A. Harel et al. eds., 2011) (citing
research supporting the proposition that “accounting fraud is the unforeseen consequence of
a sequence of minor and seemingly innocuous transgressions”); Sung Hui Kim, The
Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
983, 997 (2005) (arguing that “the behavioral origins of lawyer acquiescence in corporate
fraud are found in commonplace interaction in organizational settings”).
47. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Madoff is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009 (describing the scheme and sentencing).
48. For example, Delaware General Corporation Law permits corporations to include a
provision in their charters immunizing directors from monetary damages for losses
stemming from good faith, but negligent, decisions. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7)
(2012). Similarly, the well-known business judgment rule shields managers from judicial
second-guessing of substantive decisions. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifood Int'l, 683 A.2d
1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a general discussion of the business judgment rule, see
Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 458–59 (2011) (footnote omitted). For arguments
that Rule 10b-5 was not intended to apply to garden variety violations of fiduciary duty, see
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (rejecting Rule 10b-5 liability for “a
breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation,
or nondisclosure”).
49. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 46 (2008) (discussing various mechanisms, including markets and social
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use of shareholder litigation is to deter fraud and intentional wrongdoing,
and not mistakes or generalized nonfraud losses.50
If, despite the above policies, private litigants can successfully dress
up undeserving claims as “fraud”, then D&O insurance may provide a
valuable second-best capping and shielding function for shareholders.
Even where the merits are weak, private litigants and their attorneys may
file fraud suits because the defendant has deep pockets, the public suspects
fraud, or because attorneys are overly optimistic regarding their ability to
Pleading
file a pleading that withstands a motion to dismiss.51
requirements, including the stricter pleading rules ushered in by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199552 (as well as the demand rules for
shareholder derivative suits) may be insufficient to screen out meritless
claims.53 Accordingly, for this residual group, D&O insurance offers an
adequate second-best mechanism for capping non-fraud liability and
reducing the transaction costs of otherwise unproductive behavior.
Although it does not completely insulate shareholders from these costs,
D&O insurance keeps them in check and sets a useful frame around which
litigants can bargain.
This second-best hypothesis also explains Side A insurance, which
Baker and Griffith more or less concede. If shareholder litigation includes
unproductive plaintiff-side behavior, then Side A insurance permits
corporations to recruit talented officers and directors who also happen to
have particularly deep pockets (since those with deep pockets would be
afraid to attract individual suits), and reduces costly and inefficient risk
aversion among corporate managers.54
norms, that govern corporate managers).
50. One of Macey’s arguments is that political forces have combined to undermine the
market forces that are best poised to deal with a number of corporate governance problems.
Id. at 46–47.
51. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic At Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the
Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 155–56 (2009) (explaining that amount of recovery and
uncertainty over causes of fraud can exacerbate lawsuits). On the uncertainty inherent in
corporate law, see Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 888 (1999).
52. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act requires plaintiffs to plead specific
facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of the defendant’s scienter. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u4(b)(1), (b)(2). See generally ARTHUR PINTO & DOUGLAS BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW 512–15 (3rd ed. 2009) (summarizing the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act).
53. With regard to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Baker and Griffith
observe, “Our respondents seemed to confirm . . . that the motion to dismiss is not a perfect
filter for separating good liability cases from bad liability cases.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra
note 3, at 170.
54. As Ehud Kamar has observed, insurance is additionally valuable because it
converts a volatile, one-time payment into a series of predictable, annual (premium)
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Losses from fraud and intentional misconduct:

Of course, most commentators would disagree with the proposition
that all corporate shareholder litigation lacks merit, and quite a bit of
research suggests that these commentators are indeed correct.55 So let us
stipulate that among the many corporate losses experienced by
shareholders, some number is caused by fraud or bad faith behavior. From
that perspective, shareholder litigation may be independently valuable
insofar as it increases the cost of wrongdoing (either fraud or intentional
dereliction of fiduciary duty) to directors and officers. This is the point
where Baker and Griffith’s critique becomes important. If D&O insurance
reduces management’s liability for misconduct, it also reduces the value of
shareholder litigation by creating an accountability vacuum. That vacuum,
in turn, becomes much worse when liability insurance carriers fail to fill it
with adequate monitoring, experience-based pricing, and control of ensuing
shareholder litigation.
Fortunately, private litigation is not the end of the story, because
public enforcement impacts corporate management’s behavior as well.
Although Baker and Griffith discuss public enforcers in passing, they do
not give them full attention.56 This is in part because the authors assume
some stable distinction between “ordinary” fraud and the types of frauds
that trigger public enforcement responses.57 I focus on fraud here because
the much of the book’s focus is on the securities fraud class action.
It has long been recognized that the legal line between “ordinary”
securities fraud and the so-called “sexier” version that lands one in jail is

payments: “Insofar as fiduciaries are risk averse, their disutility from high and infrequent
monetary sanctions exceeds their disutility from low and frequent sanctions, despite the fact
that the expected sanction is the same.” Kamar, supra note 51, at 889. Note also that a
small, frequent sanction is less likely to spur costly efforts to avoid detection such as coverups and obstruction of justice. Accordingly, frequent, low-level sanctions offer society
benefits in the form of reduced detection avoidance, and, consequently, reduced policing
costs. For more on how higher sanctions can trigger additional wrongdoing, see Jacob
Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314
(2009); Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006).
55. See Langevoort, supra note 51, at 155 nn.15–16 (citing relevant research).
56. Baker and Griffith concede that D&O insurance cannot shield corporate managers
from criminal penalties and reputational harm, but presume that “these consequences do not
follow from most acts that give rise to a D&O claim.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3 at
60.
57. “Our sense is that the truly massive settlements occur in cases in which the
managers violated ordinary, business-as-usual norms by a very substantial margin, and thus
the fear of residual corporate liability, or criminal liability, most likely does not deter
managers who engage in more ordinary financial misreporting. But this would be a worthy
subject for more research.” Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
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quite faint.58 The federal law that triggers private civil liability for fraud
and misrepresentation—Rule 10b-5—is the same rule that triggers both
SEC enforcement authority and criminal prosecutions.59 Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 provide securities enforcers
with a remarkable amount of enforcement flexibility.60 So long as the
conduct is “willful”61 (and the much of the misconduct that concern Baker
and Griffith could credibly meet this definition), the same conduct likely
satisfies the requirements for criminal liability, provided the government
has collected evidence sufficient to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard.62 Accordingly, the legal boundary that separates purely private
enforcement of securities law on the one hand, and public enforcement
ranging from administrative proceedings to criminal prosecutions on the
other, is factually and legally porous.
Ordinarily, one might question the fairness and efficiency of a legal
58. Baker and Griffith’s interview subjects refer to those instances of wrongdoing that
trigger public enforcement as the “sexier” frauds. Id. at 157. “Cases with sex appeal, our
respondents emphasized, are cases with scandalous or otherwise vivid facts.” Id.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to Section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The Exchange Act provides
for criminal penalties for “willful” violations. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). See also United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 677 n.23 (1997) (reiterating that criminal penalties must be
premised on a finding that the defendant intentionally violated the law). For discussions
regarding the implications of dual-remedy statutes, see Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025 (2001) (arguing for a single interpretive
approach to dual remedy statutes); Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional
Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003) (speculating how presence of dual remedies
influences statutory interpretation in both civil and criminal cases).
60. Among claims brought by shareholders alleging misconduct by officers and
directors, “securities class actions represent, by far, the largest potential source of liability.”
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 3.
61. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (providing punishments for willful misconduct). The
United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Eighth Circuits require a showing of
intentional misconduct to meet the criminal willfulness standard. United States v. O’Hagan,
139 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1998); Trane Co. v. O’Conner Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 n.4 (2d Cir.
1983). The Ninth and Sixth Circuits permit a showing of recklessness for both criminal and
civil suits. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
DeSantis, 238 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000). For a recently filed petition for certiorari discussing
this circuit split, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCall v. United States, No. 11-882,
2012 WL 151756 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012).
62. Indeed, as a growing number of scholars have observed (and criticized), it may be
easier to prosecute a criminal violation than impose civil liability in the securities context.
Richard Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 142 (2008) (“The
bottom line is that the standard of pleading and proof in a criminal proceeding is lower than
in a civil proceeding. Clearly, something is awry.”); Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization
of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361 (2008); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among
Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2009).
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system that blurs the legal treatment of fraudulent conduct. But here, the
uncertain treatment of fraud may do some good, or at the very least, quell
some of the concerns one might have regarding D&O liability insurance. If
corporate fraud can credibly trigger administrative proceedings, civil
penalties, and criminal investigations of intentional wrongdoing, then even
the state of the art insurance policy has significant limitations. After all, as
Baker and Griffith demonstrate, D&O insurance policies contain coverage
exclusions against fines, penalties, and payments for adjudicated violations
of the law.63 If a public enforcer so desires, she can extract admissions of
intentional wrongdoing, seek fines and penalties that are explicitly
excluded by the policy, and impose structural reforms that are costly to the
company and its managers and yet beyond the reach of any D&O policy.64
In the worst of cases, a public enforcer may seek corporate prosecutions
and entity-level indictments, all of which will do massive damage to the
company’s reputation and future prospects.
Public enforcement is bad enough for the company, but it can be far
worse for the specific individuals the government targets, particularly when
the company decides to cooperate in the government’s prosecution of
corporate managers. Indeed, even when (or particularly when) the
government treats a corporate entity relatively leniently, it may focus
keenly on one or more corporate managers responsible for intentional
violations of law.65 D&O insurance offers little assurance to the targets of
such investigations. It does not prevent or compensate the public stigma
attached to civil and criminal enforcement proceedings; the loss of one’s
job; suspension or exclusion from participating in one or more regulated
industries; or, most dramatically, the imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment.
In sum, disastrous consequences can flow from a public enforcer’s
investigation of fraud.66 Although private enforcers possess a number of
63. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 186.
64. As Baker and Griffith point out, coverage exclusions for fraud often do not apply
unless “adjudicated,” which may not even be the case in public enforcement proceedings,
where defendants often settle without admitting wrongdoing. Id. at 187–88. However, the
D&O policy still may exclude payments that are designated “fines” or “penalties” or
disgorgement for ill-gotten gains. See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT & JORDAN R. PLITT, 2 PRACTICAL
TOOLS FOR HANDLING INSURANCE CASES § 14.14 (2011) (observing that the “typical D&O
policy” excludes coverage for “criminal or civil fines or penalties imposed by law”).
65. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 657–660 (2002) (describing the practice of “reverse whistleblowing” whereby corporations identify culpable employees in exchange for entity-level
leniency from government).
66. See Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to
Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 201 (2008) (describing the
punishments endured by corporate managers who were caught “cooking the books”). For
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good reasons to downplay misconduct in order to avoid an insurance
exclusion,67 public enforcers possess fewer incentives to hold their fire,
assuming there exists robust evidence of intentional misrepresentations and
schemes to defraud. Moreover, if public enforcers are in fact abdicating
their roles by declining cases or unnecessarily abandoning the requirement
that corporate managers admit wrongdoing as a condition of civil
settlements, then perhaps the easiest way to deter corporate misconduct is
to demand changes in public enforcement, assuming such demands are
warranted.68
Now it would be one thing if, despite the weak legal boundary
between private and public enforcement, corporate wrongdoers could still
predict with relative certainty the practical amount of wrongdoing that
would trigger public enforcement.69 It would be cause for great concern if
managers could calibrate, with precision, the amount of fraud likely to
trigger weak or strong public enforcement responses. This, however,
would require managers to (a) identify the public enforcement trigger, ex
ante, and (b) ensure that the extent of their fraud remained below that
trigger. Under these conditions, managers would be able to do a fair
amount of damage to the corporation’s shareholders and capital markets in
general. Directors and officers would take the modicum of care to avoid
public enforcement inquiries while simultaneously stealing (albeit slowly
more on corporate losses following public enforcement proceedings, see Jonathan Karpoff,
D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 581, 581–611 (2008). For more on the drawbacks of a corporatewide criminal indictment, see United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (referring to entity-wide indictment as the equivalent of a death sentence); Miriam H.
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1090–92 (2008) (describing the
consequences of indictment).
67. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3 at 186–88.
68. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)(rejecting
proposed settlement with Citigroup for alleged misrepresentation in sales of mortgagebacked securities). Judge Rakoff’s opinion in the case pointedly took the SEC to task for
failing to extract any admission of wrongdoing from Citigroup: “Here, the SEC’s longstanding policy—hallowed by history, but not by reason—of allowing defendants to enter
into Consent Judgments without admitting or denying the underlying allegations, deprives
the Court of even the most minimal assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being
asked to impose has any basis in fact.” Id. slip op. at 9. The Second Circuit, however,
rejected the district court’s authority to impose such demands on the SEC. SEC v. Citigroup
Global Mkts., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d. Cir. 2012) (criticizing the district court for interfering
with the agency’s “judgment on wholly discretionary matters of policy”).
69. For example, drivers can safely ignore a highway sign that specifies a speed limit
of fifty-five miles per hour if they know, from experience, that the police only arrest
speeders traveling above seventy-two miles per hour. Notice, in this instance, the drivers
can safely drive above fifty-five miles per hour because (a) they are certain that the police
arrest only those drivers whose speeds exceed seventy-two miles per hour, and (b) they have
the absolute ability to drive at speeds below the unofficial speed limit.
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and moderately) from the company’s shareholders. The ordinary fraud
would be left to private litigation and paid for by insurance (effectively, the
shareholders who were themselves victims), and the extraordinary fraud
would remain the province of federal prosecutors, state attorneys general,
and SEC enforcement attorneys. Machiavellian corporate managers who
knew how to maintain frauds at so-called “ordinary” levels could enrich
themselves at the expense of hapless shareholders, while their overly
greedy colleagues fell prey to periodic show-trials. Although Baker and
Griffith do not portray this scenario outright, they seem to presume it when
they concede only that public enforcement “may still operate to deter the
worst corporate misconduct.”70
Assuming we could test for the presence of these conditions (a stable,
transparent enforcement trigger, and sufficient managerial control to keep
fraud below that trigger), it is unlikely that we would find either of them.
Public enforcement priorities are neither stable nor transparent.71 To begin
with, public enforcement itself is hardly a monolith. State attorneys
general, who are funded by state funds and supported and elected by state
taxpayers (including shareholders) may be more aggressive and potentially
less predictable than the SEC officials who balance a constant need for
public approval, congressional funding, and corporate cooperation.72 The
SEC, despite its reputation for being weak, can also become more
aggressive in response to enforcement competition by state prosecutors.73
Federal prosecutors, meanwhile, may decide to enter the fray when the
frauds in question trigger the institutional interests of their respective
United States Attorney Offices. Finally, public opinion, which ebbs and
flows in response to economic cycles and salient scandals, also influences
enforcement priorities.74 Accordingly, predicting public enforcement
priorities is likely to be a risky and error-laden game.
Moreover, corporate managers may not find it so easy to predict in
70. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 21.
71. See Tom Baker et. al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (using empirical experiment to demonstrate the
potential deterrence benefits that flow from uncertainty).
72. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 698, 701 (2011) (exploring how state enforcement of federal law provides states with a
“unique” form of power).
73. See Coffee supra note 4, at 779 (2007) (arguing that “competition among enforcers
is healthy and has filled gaps in securities enforcement”).
74. Id. at 781 (discussing how state attorneys general are “adept” at marshaling public
opinion in their favor); see also Stephen Choi, et. al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC:
Salience and the Arc of the Option Backdating Investigation (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
11-20,
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876725 (providing empirical evidence
that state attorneys general are in fact adept at marshaling public opinion in their favor).
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advance how far or deep an apparent “ordinary” fraud will extend. Like
the public enforcement world, the corporate world itself is complex and
difficult to predict. A single decision to cook the books in one quarter may
commit a manager to cooking the books in all subsequent quarters, lest he
alert observers that prior reports were wrong.75 By the same token, a
manager who thinks he has uncovered mere “ordinary fraud” may later find
out that he has uncovered not simply a single instance of fraud, but in fact
the tip of a “super fraud” iceberg.
So if we assume that the practical, as well as legal boundaries between
white lies and disastrous deception are easily crossed, then it is not at all
clear that D&O insurance’s marginal effect on deterrence is as negative as
the authors’ account suggests. Corporations—particularly large, publicly
held ones that are continuously in the public eye—should have good reason
to fear public regulators and prosecutors, assuming those regulators and
prosecutors are competent and motivated. This is true even if the number
of cases prosecuted criminally is low relative to the number of class action
claims filed civilly, or if the amount of fines collected civilly far outstrips
the dollar value of fines collected through criminal and SEC enforcement
proceedings.76 What matters is that officers and directors perceive a real,
credible threat that the fraud they promulgate or cover up will grow into the
kind of scandal that triggers protracted investigations, unpleasant
government oversight, and significant reputational costs to their company
and to them personally.
Even more so than its managers, the corporation’s in-house attorneys
are likely to be keenly aware of the potential for frauds to blow up into
high-profile scandals.77 Public enforcement has, through a number of
different mechanisms, imposed obligations on all publicly held companies
to improve their overall compliance with the law, all of which increases
internal monitoring and external reporting by corporations. Accordingly,
corporate in-house attorneys and their external legal advisers are quite
aware of the compliance requirements embedded in the Sarbanes-Oxley

75. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV.
1295 (2008).
76. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1542–1551 (2006) (comparing the incidence and
intensity of private and public proceedings and penalties); see also Cox & Thomas, supra
note 20, at 777 (finding a “modest overlap” of fifteen percent between SEC enforcement
proceedings and private securities fraud proceedings filed between 1997 and 2002). For
more on regulatory intensity and enforcement, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 258 (2007); Howell E.
Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and
Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 271–80 (2007).
77. Indeed, this fear of fraud may cause corporate attorneys to overlook more
pernicious threats to the corporation’s health, such as excess risk.
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Act, the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and the charging memoranda
and enforcement guidelines maintained respectively by the Department of
Justice and the SEC.78 Regardless of whether they are actually costeffective, it is not a far cry to assume that these programs have increased
officers and directors’ awareness of the potential for public enforcement’s
tangible and intangible costs.79
This richer account of corporate fraud enforcement and compliance
yields several conclusions. First, for the clear-eyed, rational manager
(“Rational Manager”), the decision to engage in fraud is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Ordinary fraud can turn into extraordinary fraud,
and extraordinary fraud, when it comes to light, triggers public
enforcement and uniformly negative consequences for the company and its
individual managers. Similarly, the decision to ignore or concur in
someone else’s ordinary fraud (the usual claim lobbed at directors and
willfully blind managers) is equally senseless. The ordinary fraud that the
Rational Manager chooses to ignore might well mask extraordinary fraud,
or transform itself relatively quickly. The risks, even discounted and longterm as they may be, outweigh the benefits.
For the myopic manager (“Myopic Manager”), the calculation is
admittedly different. Myopic Manager cares most about “making his
numbers” and maintaining his job and receiving his next bonus.
Alternately, if he is innocent of his own wrongdoing but becomes aware of
someone else’s, Myopic Manager is intent on “not making waves” again
because he is worried about maintaining his position and receiving his next
bonus. In both cases, Myopic Manager vastly discounts the likelihood that
his (or someone else’s) minor fraud will turn into extraordinary fraud;
accordingly, Myopic Manager is not deterred by potential criminal
penalties or the substantial enforcement sanctions that attach to his decision
not to report someone else’s fraud. But notice, Myopic Manager probably
would not be deterred by the loss of insurance coverage either. This is so
because Myopic Manager vastly discounts the likelihood that anyone will

78. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 949, 958–75 (2009) (describing legal developments that fueled rise of compliance
industry) and Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the
Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23 (2010) (providing an
overview of different compliance requirements and enforcement guidelines).
79. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 233–35 (2009) (explaining how legal
expression can create “focal points” that make certain outcomes more likely, even when
enforcement is relatively unlikely); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in
the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Compliance,
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 865 (2008) (using experimental evidence to show how focal points
form in response to legal developments).
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catch him or his colleagues. The solution for curing the manager of his
myopia is not to remove his employer’s Side B and C insurance protection,
but rather to increase, in a credible manner, the likelihood of the fraud’s
detection, and to decrease the types of structural weaknesses that encourage
fraud in the first place.80
Currently, D&O carriers perform neither of these tasks. They do not
monitor insureds so closely as to increase the likelihood of fraud detection,
and they do not offer the types of structural loss prevention services that
would reduce the incidence of overoptimistic performance promises.81
Baker and Griffith attribute this failure to managerial agency costs. But it
may also be that the services are particularly difficult to design and sell.82
More importantly, the carriers’ reticence also may stem from the fact
that public enforcers maintain considerable prerogative to define what
constitutes adequate oversight. For example, public enforcement agencies
already require corporations to maintain “effective” compliance programs,
whose effectiveness are measured not in terms of aggregate data, but rather
by the gestalt conclusions of enforcement agents and prosecutors.83 The
same public enforcers offer corporations leniency in exchange for
monitoring and reporting of wrongdoing.84
If public enforcers maintain ultimate discretion to decide what
constitutes “effective” corporate compliance and reporting, then it is not
surprising that insurance carriers have largely avoided the corporate
monitoring and loss prevention businesses. Carriers cannot easily advise

80. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 817–18 (2010) (providing empirical and
theoretical evidence that deterrence is better achieved by increasing the likelihood of
detection, rather than increasing the severity of sanctions).
81. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 105.
82. Compliance services are arguably experience or credence goods. “Experience
goods” are ones that can be judged only after the purchaser has enjoyed personal experience
using the good. “Credence goods” are goods whose intrinsic values are difficult to discern
and therefore require the purchaser to place much credence in the sellers’ claims. See
generally Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 317–18 (2009) (explaining how
corporate governance reforms can be credence goods); Omari Scott Simmons, Corporate
Reform as a Credence Service, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 113, 119 (2010) (elaborating on the
“credence characteristics of corporate governance reform”).
83. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 78, at 977-78 (criticizing the Department of Justice for
failing to systematically gather data on compliance, or rely on such data in making
individual decisions).
84. Id. at 972. For an overview of corporate criminal liability and an economic
analysis of how offers of leniency can improve deterrence, see Jennifer Arlen, Corporate
Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
(Hylton et al. eds., forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1890733.
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their corporate customers how public enforcers will respond to a particular
oversight or monitoring problem.85 That job falls to the corporation’s inhouse and outside counsel, who not only have sufficient expertise to judge
what public prosecutors and regulators (often attorneys) may do, but also
have the ability to influence what those same enforcers will do. Insurance
carriers can make bets on which compliance failures trigger liability;
lawyers, by contrast, can persuade the public officials responsible for
deciding whether and how much liability the corporation will incur. To put
it in the insurance vernacular: corporate attorneys do not simply predict the
risk of fires; in some circumstances, they actually extinguish them too.86
Given the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that corporate attorneys
(internal or external) advise the corporation on the content and structure of
the corporate compliance program, as well as whether and when to report
wrongdoing, and the likely penalties that will befall the corporation in the
event of a compliance breakdown.87 Even if D&O insurance carriers could
perform these functions more effectively than attorneys, corporations
currently have far greater incentive to place these functions with corporate
counsel so long as public enforcers remain in the mix.88
Moreover, even if public enforcement agencies were to relinquish
their monopoly on the definition of “effective” internal compliance, the
85. As Baker and Griffith observe, carriers do in fact attempt to price governance risk
into the D&O policy, even though they fail to monitor the corporation during the life of the
policy and fail to offer incentives for companies to reduce governance risk. Moreover,
carriers have hired forensic accountants to evaluate the corporation’s internal controls.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 92.
86. One might imagine a world in which carriers employed attorneys to predict public
enforcement response, much the same way carriers employ forensic accountants. Even
here, it seems unlikely that the corporation would forego the opportunity to seek advice
from attorneys directly since that advice would be protected by the attorney-client privilege,
and because the attorney would be better positioned to interpose herself between the
company and public enforcement agency.
87. See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 450
(2008) (exploring the expansion of in-house counsel’s duties to include monitoring of
corporate compliance); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011) (discussing the
importance of in-house counsel in guarding against corporate fraud and opportunism).
88. There is currently debate on whether the corporation’s compliance program ought
to be kept separate from the General Counsel’s department. See Michele DeStefano, The
Government’s Unofficial Stance on Compliance Departments: To Comply or Not To
Comply 21–35 (Dec. 23, 2011) (unpublished article) (on file with author) (reporting on
interviews with general counsel and compliance officers). This debate, however, does not
alter the fact that corporations are much more likely to rely on lawyers than insurance
carriers to design corporate compliance systems, insofar as lawyers can better deduce public
enforcement’s reaction to a given compliance failure. Indeed, DeStefano’s research
revealed that many compliance departments continue to employ attorneys, despite the fact
that the department exists outside of the general counsel’s office. Id. at 10.
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carriers’ collective ability to set compliance obligations at optimal levels
still would not be a forgone conclusion. Baker and Griffith contend that
insurance carriers are best positioned to reduce the risk of corporate fraud
because their money is on the line.89 But Baker and Griffith’s interviews
with the insurance carriers’ employees ironically do not inspire much
confidence. Some of the guidelines that influence the carriers’ pricing
(albeit moderately), for example, are little more than bromides: “To me,
my style in terms of underwriting has been to look for the way people deal
with certain issues and how they view their goals and how they are going to
achieve them.”90
There is hardly anything objectionable about the above statement.
Nor is there anything particularly objectionable about seeking information
on internal structure, information flows, or CEO perquisites, all of which
seem to matter to the D&O insurance agents who price governance risk.91
But much of this information is already sought by multiple parties, most
notably institutional shareholders and their advisory services.92 Why are
we so sure that insurance carriers are seeking better information, or are
better positioned to evaluate the information they receive?93
Despite the foregoing, Baker and Griffith have raised an important
point. To the extent we employ a “multienforcer” approach to various
types of corporate fraud, at least one of those “enforcers”—private
shareholder litigation—may be weaker than we realize, thanks to D&O
insurance. This, in turn, places greater reliance on public enforcers. Were
all public enforcers deeply captured and enforcement actions by state and
federal officials unsuccessful or nonexistent, Baker and Griffith’s findings
would be cause for real concern. And indeed, for some types of
wrongdoing, concerns about diffident public enforcers may be well-

89. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 221.
90. Id. at 89.
91. Id. at 88–92.
92. For an overview and critique of such advisory services, see Paul Rose, The
Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887 (2007) (arguing that conflicts of interest
reduce credibility of proxy advisors’ governance advice). Rose has also argued that the link
between “good corporate governance” (as defined by proxy advisory services) and corporate
performance is uneven: “[T]his is primarily due to the fact that ‘good’ corporate
governance is firm-specific and often based on qualities, such as corporate culture, that are
not readily quantifiable and so are difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.” Paul
Rose, Regulating Risk by “Strengthening Corporate Governance,” 17 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 11
(2010) (questioning the Dodd-Frank Act’s emphasis on “strengthening corporate
governance” by focusing on executive compensation and shareholder proxy access).
93. According to Baker and Griffith, “[m]ost insurers are not rigidly quantitative in
their adjustments to price.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 96. The quantitative
models that do exist are not necessarily well-designed or rigorous. Id.
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founded.94
For example, nothing in recent memory has triggered so much
criticism of the SEC as its abject failure to identify and shut down Bernard
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.95 The SEC not only failed to act on detailed
allegations provided by an external financial analyst, but its agents
arguably did not even comprehend basic finance concepts.96 These were
hardly the building blocks of effective enforcement. But even here, the
SEC is not usually the sole source of public enforcement. Where SEC
enforcement agents fail, public prosecutors and state attorneys general may
take up the slack, with varying results.97 Even when public enforcement
withers, the public policy answer may not be strengthening private
litigation, but rather, focusing on ways to improve and reinvigorate public
enforcement, or channel public enforcement towards different targets.98
The foregoing account is not intended to suggest that no one in
corporate America commits fraud. Nor is it to say that the current public
enforcement system is the one we would choose were we starting over
from scratch. Nevertheless, despite well-documented weaknesses in
portions of our public enforcement apparatus, those who commit corporate
wrongdoing operate in a world in which drastic sanctions can apply
depending on the fraud’s scope and the public’s animus. As a result,
corporate managers have good reason to avoid wrongdoing. At the same
time—and this is one of the recurring ironies of strong enforcement
regimes—those who do engage in wrongdoing have very good reason to
take substantial steps to hide their misconduct. This is hardly a problem
that Side A, B or C insurance has caused. Nor is it a problem that ordinary
insurance carriers can easily solve. Indeed, the fact that managers hide
94. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 20, at 751 (observing that overall SEC
enforcement volume is relatively modest).
95. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899 (2009) (assessing bureaucratic and
institutional failures that contributed to the SEC’s failure to detect Madoff).
96. See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the
Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363 (2009) (providing further overview of
various factors that contributed to the SEC’s failure to detect Madoff).
97. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 763–65 (2009).
98. See Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff: Why We Should Partially
Privatize the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 783, 784 (2010) (contending that
“the SEC is simply not capable of providing adequate protection for the integrity of our
public financial markets without assistance from private attorneys general”). Alternate
approaches might be to encourage the SEC to focus more intently on corporate executives
instead of corporations and their shareholders. “[I]t has not always been so clear that
executives are the primary focus of securities enforcement in financial misreporting cases,
even when they are its main architects. Their companies often seem to be the real targets.”
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 627–28.
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their frauds demonstrates an even deeper problem, which is that stronger
sanction systems may lead managers to invest more strongly in detection
avoidance, rather than simply desisting from fraud.99
To sum up: if we assume that it is difficult to distinguish between
ordinary and extraordinary frauds, and we accept the fact that extraordinary
frauds do elicit substantial public sanctions, and that those sanctions do
alter managerial conduct, then fraud’s porous nature fills some of the
vacuum left by D&O insurance. Insurance may be overly costly, but it may
not impose as much additional hazard as Baker and Griffith fear. The
corporate world poses plenty of hazards for shareholders, but those hazards
stem from the fact that corporate managers exercise tremendous discretion
over other people’s money.100
III. POLICY PROPOSALS: ENSURING D&O DISCLOSURE
With this broader enforcement framework in mind, we can better
understand and evaluate Baker and Griffith’s policy proposals. To their
credit, Baker and Griffith do not call for the elimination of D&O insurance,
or for a rollback of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which set
the high procedural thresholds that screen out the more fanciful plaintiffs
claims, or for any of the dramatic reforms that critics periodically tout.
Instead, Baker and Griffith focus on three policy adjustments that appear
more moderate in tone and incremental in effect.
Most relevant to this Review’s focus, Baker and Griffith propose a
type of “coinsurance” whereby companies retain a portion of risk for
wrongdoing.101 Through such coinsurance, companies would maintain
some mandatory portion of risk for losses caused by managerial
misconduct.102 According to the authors, this deliberate provision of
residual risk would alter how managers behave before and after misconduct

99. On detection avoidance, see generally Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach,
Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation Versus Ex-Post Punishment, 4 REV. L. & ECON.
1 (2008); Sanchirico, supra note 54; Avraham D. Tabbach, The Social Desirability of
Punishment Avoidance, 26 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 265 (2010).
100. This point was brought home long ago by Louis Brandeis’ famous tome, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). For a discussion of Brandeis’
critique in the corporate governance context, see Edward Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics,
and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport &
Bala G. Dharan, eds., 2004).
101. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 222–25.
102. The authors purposely leave open for future discussion the details of how much
residual risk corporations would bear. Id. at 223 (conceding that “[s]etting the optimal level
of coinsurance would be a complicated corporate finance exercise that we will not attempt
here”).
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arises.103
Putting aside the authors’ concerns about how corporations settle
fraud cases, it is far from obvious that corporations with entity-level
coverage do not already enjoy a fair amount of residual risk. As the public
enforcement discussion in Part II demonstrates, most publicly held
companies already retain substantial risks related to the costs of preventing
and responding to inquiries by public enforcers. Nothing in a D&O
insurance policy shields the corporation from the effects of an investigation
by the SEC, the DOJ or any of the fifty state attorneys general. A number
of studies have documented the numerous ways in which public
investigations and prosecutions harm both their corporate targets and the
officers who are employed by them.104 Concededly, coinsurance would
shore up deterrence in those instances where public enforcement is overly
lax, and where managers can reliably prevent ordinary fraud from
triggering public inquiries. It is unclear, however, how much Baker and
Griffith’s proposal would introduce expensive redundancies rather than
close true gaps.
Coinsurance is not Baker & Griffith’s central policy proposal. Rather,
their argument is that the SEC should mandate the disclosure of corporate
D&O insurance policies. Without question, this is their strongest and most
elegant policy suggestion. Their proposal for mandatory insurance
disclosure would yield information currently unavailable to many
shareholders, such as the policy’s limits, premiums and any exceptions.105
To the extent information improves shareholder oversight through
voting and exit,106 mandatory disclosure ought to be valuable.107 Assuming
market failure has thus far failed to produce such information, Baker and
Griffith’s proposal is quite useful. That being said, the utility of the
proposal would likely come down to the details of its execution. As Baker
and Griffith report, a number of aspects of the D&O policy have little to do
with the carrier’s assessment of likelihood of wrongdoing, but rather with

103. Id. at 224-25.
104. See The Cost to Firms, supra note 66; and The Consequences to Managers for
Financial Misrepresentation, supra note 66, at 209, 212 (2008).
105. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 205–07 (observing that Delaware does not
mandate disclosure of insurance policies, and that most states follow Delaware’s lead, with
the notable exception of New York).
106. Shareholders can exert pressure on directors and officers by voting for different
directors (voice), selling their shares (exit), or bringing lawsuits (liability).
107. On the efficiency benefits of publicly mandated disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox,
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 254–55 (2009)
(explaining how mandatory disclosure improves corporate governance) (citing John C.
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
Va. L. Rev. 717, 751 (1984)).
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the risk of financial loss.108 Indeed, one of the authors’ criticisms is that
carriers currently fail to price governance risk accurately.109 If carriers
price governance risk sub-optimally, then shareholders are not likely to
learn how strongly their investment is at risk for fraud or intentional
misconduct. Perhaps mandatory disclosure itself would improve carriers’
pricing of governance risk, but this happy symbiosis is far from certain.110
One can imagine other objections. For example, depending on the
uniqueness of policies, comparison of terms might be difficult. The
information conveyed by the policies also might be redundant, assuming
analysts and sophisticated persons already enjoy access to much of the
same information that insurance carriers consider.111 Moreover, an already
overburdened public enforcer might experience difficulty ensuring that
insurance disclosures were accurate. At the other end of the spectrum, we
might see the emergence of frivolous lawsuits for supposedly misleading
D&O insurance disclosures.
Despite these objections, the authors’ proposal is quite alluring.
Surely, some of the information reflected in the corporation’s D&O policy
would be quite useful. Over time, sophisticated and institutional
shareholders would be able to develop a sense of what terms certain
policies ought or ought not to contain. A corporation’s change in policy
might trigger fruitful inquiries from shareholders or media analysts, as
might a corporation’s failure to secure a policy similar to that of its peers.
In sum, mandatory reporting may not be a panacea for the ills the authors
describe, but it offers enough benefits to merit serious consideration.
By contrast, a third proposal, which the authors explicitly label as a
thought experiment, seems least tenable: legislatures would impose a
lottery system whereby five to ten percent of all shareholder class actions
that survived a motion to dismiss would be selected for mandatory
adjudication.112 The litigants bringing such cases would be forbidden from
settling their cases prior to trial.113 The benefit Baker and Griffith
hypothesize from this imaginary lottery is additional adjudication. Were
more cases to go to trial, courts would be forced to address more liability
claims, sift through competing damage models, and impose penalty
108. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 87 (explaining that “underwriters now focus
their financial risk assessment on such factors as the prospective insured’s industry and
maturity, market capitalization, volatility, and other various accounting ratios”).
109. Id. at 103–04.
110. Id. at 219 (suggesting that “side benefit” of mandatory disclosure would be
improvement of “product market efficiency” for D&O insurance).
111. Id. at 217–18 (noting and responding to objections that sophisticated investors
“already have at least as much access to corporate managers as D&O underwriters”).
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id.
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decisions such that “the world of securities litigation . . . could begin to
resemble the model of civil litigation propounded by legal academics.”114
Leaving aside the proposal’s low political feasibility, which Baker and
Griffith duly acknowledge,115 as well as the constitutional questions it is
likely to generate (one can imagine some version of a due process
challenge), the proposal ultimately reminds the reader why public
enforcement is so important. True, shareholder plaintiffs’ premature
settlements may cause society to lose out on the informational benefits of
adjudication on the merits. Insurance carriers may well exacerbate this
problem. But the answer to this problem is not forced private adjudication,
so much as it is the maintenance of robust public enforcement. Where
private parties seek quick settlements, public enforcers can pursue results
that are more aligned with the public’s interest.
CONCLUSION
Corporate fraud is difficult to prevent. To reduce agency costs caused
by shirking and other bad behavior, shareholders demand objective
evidence of performance from officers and directors, who receive
compensation, power and prestige in return. When officers and employees
meet or exceed the market’s performance expectations, all parties benefit.
When employees and officers fall short of performance levels, however,
they cast about for substitutes. At least in the short term, fraud functions
quite nicely as a substitute for performance.116 In the long run, however, its
consequences are often disastrous.
Given the negative consequences of fraud on society, Baker and
Griffith rightly focus on the D&O insurance market and its effect on
shareholder litigation and corporate governance. Moreover, they do
readers a tremendous service by meticulously describing the contours of
the D&O industry and the manner by which D&O policies are marketed,
sold and employed. Their analysis of D&O insurance and its effect on
private shareholder litigation, however, must be considered against a
backdrop of overlapping and periodically strong instances of public
enforcement and regulation. If we believe that corporate officers and
directors respond to the threat of criminal and civil enforcement and that
public securities enforcement is even moderately credible, then the

114. Id. at 228.
115. Id. at 229 (recognizing that moral objections to use of a lottery to allocate legal
rights would likely prevail).
116. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 106 (“The temptations [to commit fraud]
are built into corporate capitalism, whether through concealment of bad news or overblown
projection of future success.”).
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situation is not quite as dire as one might conclude from reading Ensuring
Corporate Misconduct. So long as our public regulators and enforcers are
informed, well incentivized, and competent, officers and directors have
plenty to fear.117
On the other hand, Baker and Griffith’s account ought to make us
even more concerned when it appears that our public enforcers are not
operating very well, or when we conclude that the costs of improving
public enforcement are so great that we would rather focus on improving
alternatives such as private litigation.118 If private litigation fills the gaps
where public enforcement falls short; spurs public enforcement to do a
better job; and aids public enforcement by directing regulators and
prosecutors towards nascent scandals, then we might be concerned that
D&O insurance undermines private litigation’s dual functions as a backstop
and complement.119 Until we have a better handle on just how weak public
enforcement is (and more importantly, whether and how corporate actors
perceive these weaknesses), it is difficult to conclude how much D&O
insurance “ensures” corporate misconduct.
Hopefully, this is only the beginning and not the end of inquiries
regarding the practical implications of liability insurance for corporate
governance policy. By providing information about an institution that
operates primarily in the shadow of the law, Baker and Griffith have
opened the door for additional research, albeit of a different kind. For
example, experimental research might demonstrate the extent to which
managerial behavior is affected by changes in public versus private
enforcement, as well as the difference between direct protection (Side A
insurance) and indirect, entity-level protection (Sides B and C insurance).
More importantly, those who study the field of D&O insurance would
do well to separate out the product’s effect on independent directors
(outsiders who bear the bulk of oversight duties), and its effect on inside
directors and officers (often the primary architects of intentional
misconduct). It may be that the presence of D&O insurance reduces or
weakens oversight intensity, but has relatively little effect on existing
intentions to commit wrongdoing.
Finally, as we increase our knowledge of how D&O insurance affects
officers and directors, we ought to take into account the likelihood of
117. Indeed, in some instances, corporate managers may be over-deterred. See Baer,
supra note 66, at 1061, 1063–66.
118. For a recent critique of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, see Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop
or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 813–15 (2009).
119. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case For
Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273 (2009). For evidence that public and
private litigation overlap more than they complement each other, see Jessica M. Erickson,
Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2011).
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inconsistent enforcement by public actors. For example, if public enforcers
prefer to bring fraud enforcement actions against officers, but shy away
from claims that are based more on oversight and lack of appropriate action
by directors, then D&O insurance may affect management unevenly. By
the same token, highly regulated corporations may respond less poorly to
D&O’s liability shield, whereas privately held corporations that fly under
the public enforcer’s radar may be more prone to the moral hazards that
Baker and Griffith understandably fear.
If death and taxes are constants in American life, then so too are
corporate frauds and the outrage that accompanies them. For those reasons,
it is beyond debate that public and private litigation responses will continue
to thrive in the wake of corporate meltdowns and scandals. The most
successful policy prescriptions in this arena should be the ones that are
backed by strong research and go beyond analysis of formal statutes and
regulations. To that end, Baker and Griffith are exactly where they should
be. They have made a number of sensible proposals backed by their
knowledge of how D&O insurance actually works. The authors have done
us a great service by shining a light on the insurance world, a world that is
murky and divorced from the written statutes and regulations that lawyers
and judges know so well. The challenge for researchers like Baker and
Griffith—and indeed for all corporate governance policymakers—is to
figure out how those sensible policy proposals fare as part of a broader
enforcement landscape.

